Re: Upper limit?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 18:02:00 +0000
On Fri, 04 Jul 2008 20:46:13 -0700Allen wrote:> Is there an upper limit on the number of RSA Public/Private 1024 bit > key pairs possible? If so what is the relationship of the number of > 1024 bit to the number of 2048 and 4096 bit key pairs?> There are limits, but they're not particularly important.I'll oversimplify. Roughly speaking, a 1024-bit RSA public key .. .. read more..
Re: Upper limit?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 17:56:00 +0000
On Jul 4, 2008, at 9:46 PM, Allen wrote:> Is there an upper limit on the number of RSA Public/Private 1024 bit > key pairs possible? If so what is the relationship of the number of > 1024 bit to the number of 2048 and 4096 bit key pairs?Using the prime number theorem you can get an estimate on the number of such pairs. Prime number theorem says that there are asyptotically 2^{512}/ln(2^{512} .. .. read more..
Re: Upper limit?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 17:45:00 +0000
At 8:46 PM -0700 7/4/08, Allen wrote:>Is there an upper limit on the number of RSA Public/Private 1024 bit >key pairs possible? If so what is the relationship of the number of >1024 bit to the number of 2048 and 4096 bit key pairs?On a related note: why did you skip 1536 bits? There is nothing special about key lengths being an integral power of 2 bits long.--Paul Hoffman, Director--VPN .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 17:42:00 +0000
At 12:48 AM +1200 7/6/08, Peter Gutmann wrote:>Florian Weimer writes:>>* Peter Gutmann:>>> [1] Show of hands, how many people here not directly involved >>>with X.509 work>>> knew that the spec required that all extensions in CA root certificates>>> ("trust anchors" in recent X.509 jargon) be ignored by an >>>implementation?>>> So if you put in name constraints, .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 14:42:00 +0000
Florian Weimer wrote:> * Arshad Noor:>>>> http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=208800937>> On a more serious note, I think the criticism probably refers to the> fact that SKSML does not cryptopgrahically enforce proper key> management. If a participant turns bad (for instance, by storing key> material longer than permitted by the protocol), there's nothing in .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 13:03:00 +0000
* Peter Gutmann:> Florian Weimer writes:>>* Peter Gutmann:>>> [1] Show of hands, how many people here not directly involved with X.509 work>>> knew that the spec required that all extensions in CA root certificates>>> ("trust anchors" in recent X.509 jargon) be ignored by an implementation?>>> So if you put in name constraints, key usage constraints, a policy>>> .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 12:48:00 +0000
Florian Weimer writes:>* Peter Gutmann:>> [1] Show of hands, how many people here not directly involved with X.509 work>> knew that the spec required that all extensions in CA root certificates>> ("trust anchors" in recent X.509 jargon) be ignored by an implementation?>> So if you put in name constraints, key usage constraints, a policy>> identifier, etc, then a .. .. read more..
Re: ITU-T recommendations for X.509v3 certificates
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 12:37:00 +0000
Florian Weimer writes:>* Peter Gutmann:>>>Or is it unreasonable to expect that the specs match what is actually needed>>>for interoperability with existing implementations (mostly in the TLS, S/MIME>>>area)?>>>> There is very little correspondence between PKI specs and reality.>>I should have written that my main goal was to extract the public key>material, and perhaps the .. .. read more..
Upper limit?
Sat, 05 Jul 2008 03:46:00 +0000
Is there an upper limit on the number of RSA Public/Private 1024 bit key pairs possible? If so what is the relationship of the number of 1024 bit to the number of 2048 and 4096 bit key pairs?Thanks,Allen---------------------------------------------------------------------The Cryptography Mailing ListUnsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 23:57:00 +0000
* Arshad Noor:> The author of an article that appeared in InformationWeek this week> (June 30, 2008) on Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure (EKMI):>> http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=208800937>> states the following:>> "There are, of course, obstacles that must still be overcome by EKMI> proponents. For example, the proposed components are somewhat .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 23:42:00 +0000
* Peter Gutmann:> [1] Show of hands, how many people here not directly involved with X.509 work> knew that the spec required that all extensions in CA root certificates> ("trust anchors" in recent X.509 jargon) be ignored by an implementation?> So if you put in name constraints, key usage constraints, a policy> identifier, etc, then a conforming implementation is supposed to look .. .. read more..
Re: ITU-T recommendations for X.509v3 certificates
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 23:36:00 +0000
* Peter Gutmann:>>Or is it unreasonable to expect that the specs match what is actually needed>>for interoperability with existing implementations (mostly in the TLS, S/MIME>>area)?>> There is very little correspondence between PKI specs and reality.I should have written that my main goal was to extract the public keymaterial, and perhaps the validity period. I want to use thecertificates as .. .. read more..
Secure voice?
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 23:04:00 +0000
Interesting tidbit:http://www.epaynews.com/index.cgi?survey=&ref=browse&f=view&id=121516308313743148197&block="Nick Ogden, a Briton who launched one of the world's first e-commerce processors in 1994, has developed a system for voice-signed financial transactions. The Voice Transact platform was developed by Ogden's Voice Commerce Group in partnership with U.S. speech software firm Nuance .. .. read more..
Re: German banks liable for phishing (really: keylogging) attacks
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 20:43:00 +0000
* Stephan Neuhaus:> This article: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,563606,00.html> (sorry, German only) describes a judgment made by a German district> court which says that banks are liable for damages due to phishing> attacks."District court" may be a bit misleading, it's the entry-level court forthis particular type of dispute, at the lowest place in the hierarchy.> In the case in .. .. read more..
Re: WoW security: now better than most banks.
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 16:59:00 +0000
Perry E. Metzger wrote:> My bank doesn't provide any sort of authentication for logging in to> bank accounts other than passwords. However, Blizzard now allows you> to get a one time password keychain frob to log in to your World of> Warcraft account.>>> post in thread here a yr ago (1jul07) about financial institutions attempting some(disastrous) deployments in the 99/00 time-frame ... and .. .. read more..
WoW security: now better than most banks.
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 16:02:00 +0000
My bank doesn't provide any sort of authentication for logging in tobank accounts other than passwords. However, Blizzard now allows youto get a one time password keychain frob to log in to your World ofWarcraft account.http://eu.blizzard.com/en/press/080626-ba.htmlPerry---------------------------------------------------------------------The Cryptography Mailing ListUnsubscribe by sending " .. .. read more..
German banks liable for phishing (really: keylogging) attacks
Fri, 04 Jul 2008 12:48:00 +0000
This article: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,563606,00.html(sorry, German only) describes a judgment made by a German district court which says that banks are liable for damages due to phishing attacks. In the case in question, a customer was the victim of a keylogger even though he had the latest anti-virus software installed, and lost 4000 Euro. The court ruled that the bank was .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Thu, 03 Jul 2008 00:08:00 +0000
Peter Gutmann wrote:> Pat Farrell writes:>> At CyberCash, where we had real RSA/DES in the system, we found that "users>> want convenience, not security">> I think that's phrasing it a bit badly, it'd be better put as "without> usability, you won't have users" (see the Tor paper "Challenges in deploying> low-latency anonymity" for more thoughts on this). I don't think we .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 23:03:00 +0000
Pat Farrell writes:>At CyberCash, where we had real RSA/DES in the system, we found that "users>want convenience, not security"I think that's phrasing it a bit badly, it'd be better put as "withoutusability, you won't have users" (see the Tor paper "Challenges in deployinglow-latency anonymity" for more thoughts on this). This is why Skype is thedominant internet phone .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 22:45:00 +0000
Peter Gutmann wrote:> For most crypto protocols, usability is job #8,107,> right after "did we get the punctuation right in the footnotes for the third> appendix?".Usability disasters such as DNSSEC are more common than strictly cryptographic disasters such as wifi. DNSSEC is near impossible to use correctly end to end.Usually a cryptographic system is very difficult to use correctly, or to use .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 22:45:00 +0000
"Perry E. Metzger" writes:>pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:>> (Actually even that doesn't really explain something like IKE... :-).>>Having been peripherally involved in the causation change for IKE, let me>confess that it was caused by human stupidity destroying the alternatives.The reason why I was using IKE as an example is that it's a lot better-known .. .. read more..
Re: Strength in Complexity?
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 21:21:00 +0000
Hal Finney wrote:>> An example where this concern might arise would be an overly simplistic> protocol that used AES in ECB mode - "simple by design", while the> "encryption purist" advocated GCM, "more difficult to break into" but> more complex. Now, I'm sure EKMI is not doing things this way but it> is an example where "simple" would not look good to "encryption purists".> You are right, Hal. .. .. read more..
Security and Human Behavior workshop
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 18:23:00 +0000
There was a terrific interdisciplinary workshop this week at MIT on"security and human behavior". Organized by Ross Anderson andBruce Schneier, the idea was to bring together security researchersfrom diverse fields who don't normally talk with each other: computing,psychology, economics, criminology, sociology, etc.There weren't any new earth shattering research results presented; ratherthe .. .. read more..
ADMIN: microsoft.com anti-spam annoyances
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 17:31:00 +0000
For some reason, Microsoft's anti-spam filter at microsoft.com isrejecting a large fraction of the list's traffic as spam. I've lookedat the messages in question carefully and can't for the life of mefigure out why. We're not getting bounced regularly anywhere else.If you're at Microsoft and missing some fraction of list traffic, nowyou know why.-- Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com------------ .. .. read more..
Article in Globe and Mail re ATM security
Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:04:00 +0000
I don't recall seeing any discussion of this article on the list.http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080702.wgtatmbreach0702/BNStory/Technology/?page=rss&id=RTGAM.20080702.wgtatmbreach0702 Chuck Jackson [Moderator's note: when forwarding links, please include someindication of what the link is about. In this case, it is a storyabout a series of thefts of ATM card information and .. .. read more..